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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE'
Inflation and the Real Growth of State and Local 
Government Expenditures
By R o y  B a h l  a n d  J o r g e  M a r t i n e z - V a z q u e z *
Inflation was perhaps the major problem 
facing state and local government finances as 
the 1980s began. Double-digit inflation rates 
throughout much of the late 1970s had driven 
up the unit cost of providing government 
services, and because tax bases had not kept 
pace, an increase in nominal tax rates and 
cutbacks in public service levels were alleged 
to have resulted. This paper gives some 
structure to the discussion of inflation im­
pact on government budgets by formulating 
a general economic model that separates au­
tomatic from discretionary responses, and 
identifies the relative price, income, and bud­
get effects of inflation. We also estimate the 
impact of these three components on the real 
expenditures of U.S. state and local govern­
ments during the past two decades.
I. Conceptual and Measurement Issues
Several strands of the public finance liter­
ature have picked up on the importance of 
inflation as a determinant of the growth in 
government but none, we argue, have asked 
the most important question: “ What is the 
mechanism by which inflation affects the real 
demand for state and local government ex­
penditures?”
How does one measure the inflation to 
which a government will respond? Different
f Discussants: Robert P. Inman, University of Penn­
sylvania; Michelle J. White, University of Michigan; 
Howard Chemick, Hunter College.
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deflators are called for depending on whether 
the purchaser is viewed as a government unit 
or as a taxpayer (Peter Heller, 1981). There 
is also the choice between an implicit price 
deflator or a fixed-weight deflator. The first 
overestimates the effects of price changes on 
government purchases and the second un­
derestimates them. Neither is an appropriate 
deflator for transfer payments.
Most studies of the determinants of state 
and local government expenditures have used 
cross-section data, ignoring the inflation 
issue (Thomas Borcherding and Robert 
Deacon, 1972). Research on the determi­
nants of long-run changes in government 
expenditures takes inflation explicitly into 
account, but these studies have been 
straightforward empirical testing. Studies for 
Canada (Richard Bird, 1979) and the United 
States (Morris Beck, 1985) show that when 
the government expenditure-GNP ratio is 
“ appropriately” deflated, a smaller real ex­
pansion in the public sector is observed. This 
provides some evidence of a relative price 
effect, but because no underlying theoretical 
structure is presented, and because auto­
matic and discretionary changes are not sep­
arated, it is difficult to understand how 
inflation induces changes in government be­
havior.
Only a few studies have taken on the more 
explicit objective of comparing the impact of 
inflation on the revenue and expenditure 
sides of state and local government budgets. 
David Greytak and Bernard Jump (1975) 
measured the potential expenditure and rev­
enue responses to inflation in the 1970s, but 
under the assumptions that the level and mix 
of inputs would remain constant, that tax 
bases would fully respond, and that no dis­
cretionary changes would take place. They
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found that the purchasing power of state 
and local government revenues eroded by 
about 10 percent. Attiat Ott (1983) included 
discretionary as well as automatic changes, 
adjusted purchases and revenues by “ ap­
propriate” deflators, and concluded that in­
flation, during the 1969-79 period, appeared 
to generate “ tax dividends.”
Other studies have analyzed the narrower 
question of the impact of nominal income 
growth on state and local government rev­
enues and found an elasticity greater than 
unity (Daniel Feenberg and Harvey Rosen, 
1986). John Ross and Richard Reeder (1979) 
estimated the relationship between revenues 
and the implicit price deflator, holding con­
stant the nominal GNP gap, and found that 
revenues were 6-16 percent higher than they 
would have been in a noninflation world 
during the 1973-76 period.
Where this research has found, and left, 
the state of what we know about inflation 
impacts can be summarized as follows: (a) 
inflation may induce increases in the relative 
price of government goods and services, but 
since government revenues will also be driven 
up, it is not clear whether the revenue or 
expenditure stimulation will dominate; and 
(b) there is some uncertainty about whether 
(and how) discretionary tax rate changes, 
and borrowing and expenditure retrench­
ment should be counted as an impact of 
inflation.
II. The Model
A stylized model of the local and state 
subsector is developed here to explore the 
different ways in which inflation may impact 
real expenditure growth. We assume two 
types of agents, voters and bureaucrats. Vot­
ers are assumed to be sovereign in that they 
determine the level of public goods, and, 
with some time lags, the composition of 
taxes. Bureaucrats are assumed to minimize 
the production costs of public goods, and 
they administer the jurisdiction’s debt that is 
issued to purchase capital goods. Bureau­
crats can only deviate temporarily from vot­
ers’ wishes by, for example, spending rather 
than rebating federal government transfers. 
Over the longer run, for given prices and
disposable incomes, voter preferences are the 
only determinant of the jurisdiction’s expen­
ditures. This fairly standard median voter 
model treats grants as a lump sum addition 
to personal income, and total disposable in­
come is expressed net of federal income 
taxes.1
Given the desired level of public goods, 
the tax rates are set by the jurisdiction’s 
managers to generate either a balanced bud­
get or a surplus. Because adjustment in tax 
rates may take place with a lag, and because 
of the balanced budget constraint and the 
prohibition against financing current expen­
ditures with debt, it may be necessary for the 
jurisdiction to supply a disequilibrium level 
of public goods until tax rates can be ad­
justed. Such a disequilibrium situation is less 
likely to occur when the reserve position of 
the local jurisdiction is strong.
We assume that in production the elastic­
ity of substitution of capital for labor, capi­
tal intensity, and the rate of technological 
change are all smaller for the public good 
than for the private good and housing (Wil­
liam Baumol, 1967). The initial equilibrium 
in public and private goods will not be dis­
turbed if all prices and nominal values (in­
comes, transfers and debt, etc.) continue to 
increase period after period at the same rate, 
if the federal income tax is indexed to infla­
tion, and if the real level of grants is held 
constant. It is highly improbable, of course, 
that all rates of change in nominal values 
will be the same in a generalized inflation 
environment. More likely, inflation is accom­
panied by changes in the relative price of 
factors of production and therefore of public 
vs. private goods (Beck; Bird). The interest 
in this paper is in this more general condi­
tion, and in particular with three effects: (a) 
an automatic real income effect that comes 
about because of the progressivity of the 
federal income tax and the inflow of federal 
grants; (b) an automatic relative price effect 
that is due to differential inflation rates for 
state and local government sector goods and
lA full specification of the model (which includes 
public goods, private goods and housing) is available 
upon request from the authors.
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services vis-a-vis housing and other private 
goods; and (c) the discretionary changes that 
the income and price effects call forth. Our 
goal is to disentangle these three effects.
Even if a taxpayer’s nominal income keeps 
up with inflation, his real purchasing power 
can be decreased by a progressive federal 
income tax that is not fully indexed. Since 
state and local public services are not infe­
rior goods, this will cause a reduction in the 
real demand for government revenues. The 
other component of the real income effect is 
federal grants, which can partially offset the 
effects of income tax bracket creep. This 
model assumes that such offsets occur on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis and there are no 
“ flypaper” effects associated with grants.
In a generalized inflation environment, it 
is almost certain that some prices will in­
crease faster than others. In particular, in­
flationary expectations can lead to wage in­
creases in excess of the general inflation rate. 
Relatively larger labor shares, lower rates of 
labor productivity improvement, and lower 
elasticities of substitution of capital for labor 
make it much harder for the state and local 
sector to absorb labor cost inflation. We 
assume in this model that inflation drives up 
wages by more than the general rate of price 
increase, hence the marginal cost of provid­
ing government goods increases by more than 
that for private goods. This increase in the 
relative price will lead to a decrease in the 
demand for government goods and services. 
Whether this will be accompanied by an 
increase in desired expenditures depends on 
the price elasticity of demand.
The third effect is the impact of discre­
tionary actions and institutional constraints 
on the actual level of public services pro­
vided. One view is that government units are 
able to adjust optimally via a combination of 
automatic and discretionary responses, to the 
relative price and real income effects induced 
by inflation. Here, taxes are a veil and rates 
simply adjust as needed. Another view is 
that institutional frictions constrain taxes 
from fully adjusting in the short run and 
that the actual real expenditure levels ob­
served at any moment in time may not be 
equilibrium levels. A “ budget effect” can be 
defined as the difference between the opti­
mal quantity of public services demanded 
and that which is finally provided. Examples 
of friction are provided by lagged property 
value reassessment or the omission of ser­
vices from the sales tax base. Together with 
a balanced budget requirement, and the po­
litical or legal limits to discretionary rate 
changes, the jurisdiction will have to settle 
(temporarily) for a quantity of the public 
good that is smaller than that desired.
The size of the budget effect will be influ­
enced by two factors. The first is the income 
elasticity of the tax bases, ceteris paribus, a 
greater effect might be expected from com­
munities relying more heavily on the prop­
erty tax. The second is the size of the net 
indebtedness of the community. The budget 
effect will be smaller if, for example, the 
community is holding a surplus on which 
they may draw to reach desired expenditure 
levels.
III. Empirical Results
Annual data from the National Income 
and Product Accounts are used here to test 
for the presence of these three effects over 
the 1972-88 period. To capture the behavior 
of real expenditures over the sample period, 
we consider two definitions of the dependent 
variable. The first includes all expenditures 
on goods and services, transfers to individu­
als and interest payments. The second in­
cludes only government purchases. Both 
measures are deflated by the fixed-weight 
price index of state and local governments.
Changes in real expenditures over the 
sample period reflect the impact of inflation, 
but they also reflect changes in the determi­
nants of real demand which take place inde­
pendent of inflation. The determinants we 
take into account here are population and 
personal income. We control for population 
growth by measuring the dependent variable, 
and where appropriate, the explanatory vari­
ables, in per capita terms. To control for 
income changes, we use per capita personal 
income deflated by the fixed-weight price 
index for personal consumption as an inde­
pendent variable.
The explanatory variable for relative prices 
is measured as the ratio of the fixed-weight
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price indices for state and local government 
purchases and for GNP. The real income 
effect of inflation due to federal income taxes 
and grants is represented in the regression 
equations by two separate explanatory vari­
ables: per capita federal income taxes de­
flated by the fixed-weight price index for 
personal consumption expenditures, and per 
capita federal grants-in-aid deflated by the 
fixed-weighted price index for state and local 
government purchases. The hypothesis is that 
inflation will erode increases in nominal in­
come because of bracket creep and the fed­
eral income tax variable will therefore be 
negatively related to real expenditures, but 
that increases in federal grants will stimulate 
real demand.
To capture the presence of the budget 
effect, we use the net liability position of the 
state and local government sector lagged by 
one year. The variable is measured in per 
capita terms and deflated by the fixed-weight 
price index for state and local government 
purchases of goods and services. Net liability 
of state and local governments is defined as 
total debt outstanding minus financial asset 
holdings in the Flow of Funds Accounts, 
and in this analysis excludes assets or liabili­
ties of the pension and retirement funds. The 
hypothesis here is that the budget effect, 
ceteris paribus, will be weaker to the extent 
the financial asset position is stronger. Be­
cause this variable is specified as net liabili­
ties, the coefficient should be negatively 
signed.
Since the explanatory variables include the 
relative price, estimation is by two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) using the state and local 
government compensation of employees 
fixed-weight price index and the AAA mu­
nicipal bond rate as additional instruments. 
From the different specifications we tried, 
the log-linear specification performed best, 
and is reported in Table 1. The Durbin- 
Watson coefficients do not suggest a serious 
problem with autocorrelated errors, and a 
Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment left the esti­
mated equations practically unchanged.
All coefficients take the expected sign and 
are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. After controlling for population and 
real personal income changes, the three ef-
T a b l e  1 — 2SLS R e g r e s s io n  E q u a t io n s : 
R e a l  P e r  C a p it a  E x p e n d it u r e s  f o r  
t h e  S t a t e  a n d  L o c a l  S e c t o r , 1972-88*
Explanatory
Variables
Total
(1)
Purchases
(2)
Relative Price —1.83 -2 .2 2
<3.08)b (3.17)b
Per capita real 0.95 0.89
personal income (2.68)° (2.14)c
Per capita real -0 .4 4 -0 .40
federal income tax (4.27)b (3.32)b
Per capita real 0.23 0.30
federal aid (2.84)c (3.19)b
Per capita real — 0.21 -0 .2 2
net liabilities. (3.15)b (2.79)c
lagged one year
Constant 12.12 11.61
(2.92)c (2.86)c
Adjusted R2 0.886 0.703
D- W  Statistic 2.14 2.12
/•"-Statistic 25.93 8.57
“All variables in logarithms. Absolute value of /-sta­
tistics in parentheses. Dependent variable: Per capita 
real expenditures.
bSignificant at the 0.01 level by a two-tail test. 
‘Significant at the 0.05 level by a two-tail test.
fects that potentially are caused by inflation, 
and developed in our model, appear to have 
played a significant role in the determination 
of real growth in the state and local govern­
ment sector in the 1 9 7 2 -8 8  period.
The coefficients for the relative price effect 
indicate the existence of an elastic response 
of per capita real expenditures. Previous esti­
mates of price elasticities in the literature 
have been in the inelastic range, but these 
estimates were obtained from cross-section, 
disaggregated data, with nominal (as op­
posed to real) measures of expenditure, and 
considered the own-price rather than the rel­
ative price effect. The coefficient for personal 
income shows real demand to be income 
inelastic although the elasticities are near 
unity.
The real income effect is as expected in 
that federal tax liabilities take on a negative 
sign, and grants are directly related to the 
level of expenditure. Given the presence of 
bracket creep and the declining level of real 
grants over much of the period under study, 
the real income effect dampened the demand
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for state and local government expenditures. 
However, taken at mean values, the esti­
mated marginal propensity to spend on state 
and local government services is higher for 
federal grants-in-aid than for personal in­
come. This finding is more consistent with 
the flypaper effect than the fungibility model 
assumed here.
The net liability variable has the expected 
negative sign. When the financial position of 
the sector is weaker, the observed level of 
real expenditures is lower. This finding is 
consistent with our hypothesis about the ex­
istence of a “ budget effect,” due to frictions 
that slow the adjustment process. It is also 
consistent with the argument that there is a 
“ wealth effect” that will cause the median 
voter to demand a higher level of expendi­
tures.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
While the previous literature on role of the 
inflation in determining the real growth of 
state and local government budgets has con­
tributed to our understanding of several 
measurement issues, it has failed to provide 
an adequate framework to sort out the state 
and local government response to inflation. 
Analysts and policymakers alike seem to be 
confused over whether inflation should be 
viewed as a fiscal bonus with dominating 
revenue effects, or as primarily a cost matter 
and an important contribution to fiscal dis­
tress. In this paper we develop a stylized 
model of state and local behavior and iden­
tify three effects of inflation on the real 
demand for state and local government ser­
vices: a relative price effect, a real income 
effect, and a budget effect. The budget effect 
measures disequilibrium between actual and 
demanded levels of expenditure, and it 
should be present only when necessary dis­
cretionary adjustments do not take place. In 
these situations, the budget process is not a 
veil and has a real impact on demand. Tests 
for the presence of the three effects, using 
annual data for state and local governments
for 1972-88, give results that are consistent
with the model developed here.
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